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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[September

injunctive relief at the instance of the state against the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision or statute.12 It is therefore suggested
that Arride 15, Section 6 is self-executing to the extent that it may be enforced by the courts through the use of the injunction when invoked
by prosecuting officers.'3
EUGENE SULKEM

TORTS -

INDEPENDENT TORT-FEASORS -

ENTIRE LIABILITY

The plaintiff alleged that A and B corporations negligently permitted
their respective pipe lines to break, allowing salt water and oil to escape and
drain into the plaintiff's lake. The defendants' pleas in abatement asserting a misjoinder of parties and causes of action were sustained by the lower
court on the ground that the petition did not allege a concert of action or
unity of design between the defendants and therefore did not state a case of
joint and several liability. Held: Judgment reversed, overruling a previous
Texas case, one justice dissenting. The court reasoned that whenever the
tortious acts of two or more wrong-doers unite to produce an invisible
injury all the wrongdoers will be held jointly and severally liable.'
It is generally held that defendants do not cause a single indivisible
injury where they independently contribute pollution to the total pollution
of the plaintiffs stream2 or air,3 unlawfully contribute flood waters to the
total flooding of his land, 4 or independently contribute noise to a noise
nuisance. 5 It is usually held that such separate tort-feasors may not be
joined in the same action." The primary reason advanced for these results
7
is that damages in these cases are capable of at least a rough apportionment
This view has been attacked by most text-writers. 8 Their criticism is based
on the premise that many tunes the injury is, "as a practical matter and
realistically considered, but a single indivisible injury, incapable of apportionment."
That injustice may be caused by the view taken in the majority of cases
is well illustrated by the Texas decisions prior to the principal case. Zealous
" lore Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092 (1892) (injunction against interference
with interstate commerce); State v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929)
(injunction against usury in violation of statute).
'See State ex rel Hunter v. Fox Beatrice Theatre Corp., 133 Neb. 392, 275 N.W
605 (1937); State ex rel. Sorensen v. Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Co., 118 Neb. 851, 226
N.W 705 (1929)
In the Fox Theatre case the court said: "Lottery laws are directed against an evil and it is the duty of courts to give effect to the remedies inyoked by prosecuting officers." And see State v. Fox Great Falls Theatre Corp. 114
Mont. 52, 91, 132, P.2d 689, 708 (1942), in which a dissenting judge stated that
the injunction is a proper remedy to enforce a self-executing constitutional provision
prohibiting lotteries.
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to prevent unfairness to a defendant, the courts often left the plaintiff
remediless because he could not discharge with sufficient certainty the burden of proving the portion of the injury attributable to each defendant.10
It has been suggested in answer to this difficulty that the rule of divisibility
be retained, but that the burden of proving the respective shares of damages
be shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant.1 '
The suggested modification of the majority rule should be contrasted
with other types of judicial solutions which grew up in a crazy quilt pattern
alongside the cases affirming the traditional view. One court attempted
to make a distinction between tort-feasors who created a private nuisance
and those who created a public nuisance, the latter being held entirely
liable for damages caused by their concurrent negligence in a situation in
which only separate liability would have been imposed in a private nuisance
situation. 2 Finding concert where in fact there was none, at least in the
'Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Texas 1952),

overruling Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Texas Commission of Appeals 1930).
'City of Mansfield v. Bristor, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907).
'Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 111 Tenn. 430, 78 S.W 93 (1903). RESTATEmENT,ToRTs § 881 (1939).
'Win. Tackaberry Co. v.Sioux City Service Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N.W 945
(1911).
'Sherman Gas & Elec. Co. v. Belden, 103 Tex. 59, 123 S.W 119 (1909).
'Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
7
"the amount
discharged into the stream by each [defendant] and the degree
of polluting properties ineach, furnish an approximate guide to a reasonable division of the damages." City of Columbus v. Rohr, 20 Ohio C. Dec. 155, 10 Ohio
C.C.(N.S.) 320 (1907).
' 1 CoOLEY ON TORTs 276-287 (4th ed. 1932). Jackson, Joint Torts and Several
Lfability, 17 TE. L REV. 399 (1939); Wigmore, Joint Tort-Feasors and Severance of Damages;Makng an Innocent PartySuffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv.
458 (1922); Comment, 19 CALiF. L. REv. 630 (1931). Prosser is alone among
the writers. He feels that the disadvantages have been exaggerated. See PROssER,
ToRTs 335 (1941).
'Jackson, supra note 16, at 402. There is a line of cases dating from the year 1802
that approve this view, but they constitute a definite minority. Hill v. Smith, 32
Cal. 166 (1867); McDaniel v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899
(1913); Greer v. Pelican Natural Gas Co., 163 So. 431 (La. App. 1935); Tidal
Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okl. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931); Wright v. Cooper, 1 Tyler 425
(Vt. 1802). Cf. Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 180 Md. 395, 399, 24 A.2d
788, 791 (1942).
10
Algorde Oil Co. v. Hokanson, 179 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944); Paluxy
Asphalt Co. v. Helton, 144 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Tucker Oil Co. v.
Mathews, 119 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
U Wigmore, supra note 16, at 459.
Professor Wigmore suggests that the rule of
joint and several liability was designed to relieve a plaintiff of the intolerable burden of proving what share each of two or more wrongdoers contributed to plaintiff's
injuries.

